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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Depression-era Supreme Court decision Home 
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell has been reviled as 
one of the worst in the history of the high court.  This paper 
argues that it was one of the most prescient and practical of its 
decisions.  
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 The 1934 Supreme Court case Home Building and 
Loan Association v. Blaisdell1 made the list as one of The Dirty 
Dozen, a book authored by Robert A. Levy and William Melor 
in 2008.2  The authors argue that Blaisdell, among others 
selected to their list of dishonor, ranks among the worst 
overreaches of government power sanctioned by the United 
States Supreme Court.  
 This article argues that the contrary is the case: that the 
decision was prescient in anticipating and signaling a change in 
the courts pro-business approach in 1937.  It also demonstrated 
the court’s deference to a state’s decision to invoke its 
emergency powers to aid citizens caught in the economic 
disaster of the Great Depression. 
 The Dirty Dozen which added Blaisdell to the list of 
“bad decisions” by the high court, first appeared in 2008, just 
as the impact of the “Great Recession” was taking hold in the 
United States.3 
 This paper leaves it to the reader to judge if Blaisdell 
was a “bad decision” and also raises the question of why states 
did not intervene to protect their citizens in 2008-13 as they did 
in the 1930s. 
 
The Background of the Case 
 In 1933, the state passed the Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium Act.  The  legislature was aware of the challenges 
facing farmers and home owners during the Depression.4  
Because many could not pay the mortgages that were due on 
their land and houses, the law allowed courts to prevent 
foreclosures even where the property owners had defaulted on 
their payments.   
 John and Rosella Blaisdell used the law to prevent their 
14 room house and garage from being foreclosed upon even 
though they were paying a small amount to the lender each 
month.5  The Home Building and Loan Association went to 
court to obtain its money but the state court ruled in favor of 
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the Blaisdells, that the law protected them from having to pay 
more than $40.00 per month which was the fair rental value of 
the property.6 
 The case turned on Article I section 10 of the 
Constitution which states:   
“…No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of 
contracts”…7 
 
 The clause, placed in the Constitution in 1787 at the 
urging of Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, had its 
origin in the economic crisis in the fledging United States in 
the 1780s.8 
 Many Americans could not pay their debts and two 
points of view on the problem emerged.  Creditors maintained 
that just debts should be paid since they had been legally 
incurred by the borrowers and through “hard work and 
frugality” the obligations should and could be met.9 
 On the other side were advocates of compassion for 
those who found themselves in financial distress.  Some states 
passed laws that imposed delays on lawsuits brought by 
creditors to collect their debts.10  Among the consequences of 
these laws was reluctance on the part of lenders to extend 
credit since there was uncertainty about their ability to 
eventually collect what was owed. 
 
 One of the most alarming events from the point of view 
of the propertied class was Shays Rebellion in 1786-1787.  
That uprising was led by small farmers who found themselves 
unable to pay their debts and taxes.  Their plan was to prevent 
court sessions from being held to protect creditor rights.11 
 
 Ostensibly the reason for convening the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 was to amend the governing document, 
allowing the Articles of Confederation, which contained no 
provision allowing the national government to intervene to 
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ameliorate the debt crisis.  
The convention resolved to prohibit states from meddling in 
private contracts like the ones between creditors and debtors.12 
 
 Since the “contracts” clause contained very few words, 
the Supreme Court had to interpret what it meant, an 
opportunity that arose in some early cases most notably 
Fletcher v. Peck13 and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.14 
  
 Even though the clause did not distinguish between 
public and private agreements, Fletcher v. Peck dealt with the 
issue of public contracts.  In that case, Chief Justice John 
Marshall used the contract clause to prevent Georgia from 
trying to avoid the consequences of land grants the state had 
made years earlier. 
 In the most prominent case involving the clause, 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Marshall 
court prevented the New Hampshire legislature from altering 
the 1769 charter that authorized the creation of the college.   
 From these early cases and others decided in the latter 
part of the 19th century, it was clear that the court established 
the parameters within which the Contract clause cases would 
be decided.  The court determined that the clause applied to 
existing contracts not to future agreements.  The court also 
believed that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution 
to bar government interference with contracts that had already 
been made in accordance with laws that were in place at the 
time.15 
 It was also clear, and this became the salient point in 
Blaisdell, that the Contract clause is not superior to the police 
power of the states.16  The latter power, which has never been 
ceded to the federal government, permits the state to exercise 
all powers that are necessary to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of its people.17  The principles of the Contract clause 
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and the state’s police power collided in the Blaisdell case.   
 When the Blaisdells borrowed $3800.00 from the Home 
Building and Loan, they agreed to a mortgage on their home 
and land and that, if they defaulted, the lender could sell the 
property.18  The Building and Loan put the property up for sale 
and then bought it for the amount of the mortgage which was in 
accordance with the original contract.  Under the Minnesota 
law in effect when the Blaisdell’s bought the property and 
when the Building and Loan eventually purchased it, the latter 
became the owner.19 
 
 Under the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act 
however, the legislation declared because there was an 
economic emergency, the lender could not foreclose on the 
property even if the debtor did not pay his obligation.20 
 Upholding the law the Minnesota Supreme Court 
delayed the transfer of title to the Building and Loan for two 
years and ordered the Blaisdells to pay $40 each month and 
live in the house.  If they paid the monthly fee, the Blaisdells 
could again pay the mortgage once the two years were up.21 
 To some, especially hard-passed debtors, this seemed 
like a fair bargain, but to those who were defenders of contract 
rights, it seemed as though the lender was being denied its 
rights to own and sell the property which put the Building and 
Loan in a vulnerable position subject to declining property 
values as the Depression continued.22  
 
THE HUGHES MAJORITY v. THE SUTHERLAND 
DISSENT 
 
 The Supreme Court decision split 5-4.  Voting with the 
majority were Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo.23  
The minority consisted of the so-called “Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse”, Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, James 
McReynolds and the author of the dissenting opinion, George 
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Sutherland.24  These justices formed the conservative core of 
the court, striking down virtually all New Deal legislation that 
came before it. 
 The author of the majority opinion Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes emphasized that the police power of the 
states is basic to the federal system, noting that the economic 
emergency did not justify its existence but did justify the use of 
the power.25 
 The Depression created the need for the use of the 
police power because of the dire conditions it had created for 
homeowners. 
 Hughes conceded that the Minnesota law was the kind 
that the contract clause was designed to prevent.  In fact, early 
cases had voided similar laws.26 
 Hughes believed that the Constitution should be 
interpreted differently given the current conditions.  An earlier 
precedent, Bronson v. Kinzie27, appeared to be a case directly 
on point.  Illinois had passed a law as a response to the Panic of 
1837.  The legislation allowed debtors to buy property sold at a 
foreclosure sale by paying the purchase price and 10% interest.  
The court struck down the law violative of the contract 
clause.28 
 Hughes seemed to believe that such precedents did not 
apply to the Blaisdell case.  He preferred that the court apply 
cases which held that “the state…continues to possess authority 
to safeguard the vital interests of its people.”29  Significantly, 
he wrote:  
  The economic interest of the state 
may justify the exercise of its continuing  
and dominant protective power 
notwithstanding interference with contracts.30 
 
  
 According to Hughes, the contract clause does not, 
therefore, prohibit all impairment of contractual obligations.   
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 Hughes stated that the Court had a growing 
appreciation of “public needs and of the necessity of finding 
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights 
and public welfare.”31 
 The originalist interpretation of the Constitution holds 
that “what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision 
of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.”32 
 Hughes believed that a judge could not fully know the 
meaning of a constitutional provision until he had considered 
the social and political background of the case.33  A critic 
would argue that Hughes’ approach places no constraints on 
the exercise of judicial power:  The Constitution is whatever 
the justices of the Supreme Court at any given time say it is. 
 The basic premise of Justice Sutherland’s dissent is that 
what the contract clause meant when “framed and adopted”, it 
should mean for all time.34 
  A provision of the Constitution…. 
does not mean one thing at one  
time and an entirely different thing at  
  another time.”35 
 
 Sutherland was particularly disdainful of the majority’s 
argument that “an essential attribute of sovereign power is to 
safeguard the vital interest of its people.”36  Sutherland 
questioned whether Blaisdell’s financial problems affected the 
fundamental interest of the state. 
 Sutherland believed that there were certain activities 
within the police power of the state, like “banning the sale or 
manufacturing of intoxicating liquors” or preventing “private 
parties from creating harmful nuisances.37  Debt relief did not 
fall into that category since the loan to the Blaisdell’s was legal 
when it was made and similarl loans were legal even after the 
moratorium law went into effect.38 
 In Sutherland’s view all the Minnesota legislature 
enabled the Blaisdells to avoid their obligations under a 
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contract they had entered and prevented the Building and Loan 
from enforcing an obligation that was as lawful after the statute 
was passed as it was before.39 
 The majority opinion believed that the relief provided 
by the statute was “reasonable and appropriate” since the 
Blaisdells had to eventually pay the mortgage.  Only time for 
payment had been extended and during the extension period 
the Blaisdells still had to pay a monthly rent to the lender.40 
 Sutherland worried about the latter’s plight more than 
that of the impoverished homeowner.  Sutherland believed that 
the rental was scant compensation for the lender’s inability to 
foreclose.  Sutherland wondered about the impact on the 
lenders interests should the quality of the building deteriorate 
and the value of property fall below the purchase price.41 
 
 Hughes’ majority opinion and Sutherland’s dissent 
represent opposite poles of constitutional interpretation.  
Hughes believed that a provision of the Constitution has little 
meaning in the abstract, that it should be interpreted in the 
context of the entire Constitution and the “social situation 
confronting the court.42 
 Thus, there can be different results despite the 
similarity in the facts of the case depending on the point in time 
in which the case is decided. 
 Sutherland repudiated such a position stating that the 
Founding Fathers fixed the meaning of the Contract clause in 
all cases for all time.  As Sutherland and the dissenters read the 
Contract clause, the mortgage moratorium law was 
unconstitutional.43 
 
THE EFFECT OF BLAISDELL TODAY 
 While most commentators agree that Blaisdell rendered 
the Contract clause virtually moribund, there were two cases 
decided by the Court in the 1970s that belied that notion:  
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey44 and Allied Structural 
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Steel Co. V. Spannaus.45 
 
 In the United States Trust Co. case, the Court struck 
down a New Jersey law that impaired the rights of bondholders 
by repealing a covenant that barred the use of bond funds for 
mass transit.  The court found that the impairment of the bond 
holders rights was not “necessary” since lesser measures could 
have been used to serve the state’s goals.46 
 In the Allied Structural Steel case decided in 1978, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota law that impaired a 
private agreement.  The law required that an employer who 
ended a pension plan or left the state had to fund pensions for 
workers with ten years of service to the company even if their 
rights were not vested under the original plan.  The court found 
that this law significantly altered the obligations of employers 
under existing private pension fund contracts.47 
 Since its decision in the Allied case it appears that the 
Supreme Court has reverted to a Blaisdell like approach.  In 
three cases,48 the Court has made it clear that in cases involving 
the impairment of private contracts, it will defer to state’s 
judgment of reasonableness and necessity. 
 It appears that the present Supreme Court defers to state 
legislatures’ determinations of the need to abrogate a contract.  
The Court first determines if the state law involves a 
“substantial impairment of a contract.49  If there is a substantial 
impairment, a state can argue that the law has “significant and 
legitimate public purpose” such as a alleviating a social or 
economic situation.50  But as subsequent cases indicate, the 
problem need not necessarily be an emergency.  For example 
in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light 
Co., the Court upheld a law that capped price increases under a 
natural gas supply contract, which was an economic hardship 
not a national economic crisis.51 
 Finally the Court will not approve changes to the 
parties’ contract if they are unreasonable and unrelated to the 
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purpose of the law.52 
 That the courts are unlikely to overturn state laws that 
abrogate contracts whose purpose is to remedy an economic 
hardship is evidenced by lower federal court action in 
connection with two natural disasters.53  When Hurricane 
Andrew struck Florida in 1992, it was then the most expensive 
storm in United States history (later surpassed by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005)54 causing property damage amounting to $16-
18 billion. 
 Because the insurance companies had written policies 
and charged premiums that were inadequate to cover the 
damage inflicted by Andrew, some insurance companies went 
bankrupt.  After the storm, the companies that remained in 
business cancelled policies and did not renew others.55 
 In response, the state legislature passed and Governor 
Lawton Chiles signed legislation to bar the cancellation or non-
renewal of homeowner’s policies for six months.56 
 In Veta Fire Insurance Corp. v. State of Florida,57 the 
Court of Appeals dismissed the Contract Clause argument by 
the insurance company holding “the statute’s impact on 
existing insurance contracts cannot be said to be a 
constitutional impairment.”58 
 
 In 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck several southern 
states including Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.  Then 
Hurricane Rita hit southwestern Louisiana.  Again the 
insurance companies were hit with extraordinary losses – in 
excess of $60 billion.59  Under Louisiana law the companies 
had to allow policy holders twelve months to submit claims. 
 The Louisiana legislature passed a law signed by 
Governor Kathleen Blanco which extended the time period for 
the filing of claims to two years.  The insurance companies 
sued claiming that Louisiana impaired their contractual 
obligations.60  In State of Louisiana v. All Property and 
Casualty Insurance Carriers Authorized and Licensed to Do 
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Business in the State of Louisiana61 the court held that 
measures taken by the legislature were both “appropriate and 
reasonable in order to protect the rights of the citizens of 
Louisiana and their general welfare”.62  The courts in both 
cases based their decisions on Blaisdell and its progeny.   
 Senator Ellen Anderson (DFL – St. Paul) and 
Representative Jim Davnie (DFL-Minneapolis) introduced the 
Minnesota Subprime Foreclosure Deferment Act of 2008 to 
stop foreclosures of sub-prime or negative amortization63 loans 
for one year although homeowners would have had to make 
minimum monthly payments.64  The one-year grace period 
would have allowed homeowners time to negotiate with their 
lenders while awaiting a federal program.   
 The legislators estimated that at least 15,000 
homeowners of approximately 33,500 were expected to face 
foreclosure.65 
 Andersen and Davnie emphasized that their bill differed 
from the old Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act which was 
broader in scope.  The 2008 version would have required 
lenders to cancel sheriffs foreclosure auctions for one year if 
the homeowner had a subprime or negative amortization loans 
made between Jan 1, 2001 and August 1, 2007.66 
 While homeowners would have had to continue making 
payments, they would have to pay than less 65% of the 
payments they were making when they defaulted or the 
minimum payment they made when they first got their loan.  If 
the homeowner missed a payment, the foreclosure action 
would resume.67 
 The bill did not explain how property owners would 
later make up the money they did not pay during the grace 
period.  Apparently that matter would have been left to 
negotiations between the banks and the homeowners.   
 Prentiss Cox, a law professor at the University of 
Minnesota, stated that the 1933 act was far more sweeping, but 
argued that because of the current crisis the state should 
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intervene as “a response to abusive and unfair subprime 
lending that went unchecked for a decade.”68 
 The bill passed both Houses despite opposition 
mounted by the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA).  Both groups argued that the law would result in 
increased costs for all borrowers and the possibility that the 
supply of money to the mortgage market would dry up.69 
 
 The argument became academic when Republican 
Governor Tim Pawlenty vetoed the bill. The Governor issued a 
written statement.  
  No other state in the nation has  
enacted a bill like (this). There is  
a reason for that, it is not sound policy.70 
 
 The bill was never reintroduced but, given its modest 
provisions and the attitude of the Supreme Court in Blaisdell 
and in subsequent cases discussed here, it would likely have 
been upheld. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 It is the duty of government to protect its citizens and 
the states have a weapon to do so:  the police power.  In the 
face of the greatest threat to the survival of the country:  the 
Great Depression, Minnesota acted to protect homeowners 
from mass foreclosure.   
  To claim as Sutherland did that 
the value of money being held 
  constant, without the consent of  
the debtor, the mortgage moratorium  
statute of issue in Blaisdell represented  
an awkward, perhaps even clumsy,  
effort at the state level to undo the  
mischief brought on by federal action. 
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The state statute can be justified 
  not as an effort to correct market  
outcomes but as an effort to correct  
government misconduct – meddling 
with private contracts – that falls within  
the traditional confines of the police 
   power.71   
 
 The issue in Blaisdell was far more complex than the 
3800.00 owed by the family.  The decision may have 
undermined the Contract Clause but enhanced the state’s police 
power and gave the latter the right to protect its citizens to even 
the playing field between creditors and borrowers.72 
 The Supreme Court may well have to address even 
more ambitious efforts by the states and municipalities to 
assuage the adverse effects of the Great Recession.  Many 
cities are embracing the concept of eminent domain as a device 
to seize homes that are underwater.   
 The Home Affordable Modification Program has not 
produced results many had hoped for because it relies on banks 
to deal with the crisis.73 
 Evidence shows that entities like the Bank of America 
“denied mortgage modifications to qualified homeowners, 
falsely claimed not to have received necessary paperwork, 
falsified electronic records, ignored properly completed 
applications, denied applications en masse because the 
paperwork was no longer current, and gave employees bonuses 
for pushing homeowners who qualified for modification 
because foreclosures were more profitable.”74 
 During the housing bubble, banks bundled mortgages 
and sold securities backed by the loans.  Since the banks do not 
own these securitized mortgages, they only service these 
mortgages for investors.75  Therefore they have little incentive 
to expend the to negotiate a modification. 
 The bankers have threatened to sue and to cutback on 
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their lending so some communities have backed off.  But other 
municipalities are forging ahead:  to buy mortgages that are 
likely to end up in foreclosure and negotiate new ones that 
homeowners can afford.76 
 When the economic system fails can there be any doubt 
that the states can and should exercise the police power?  As a 
result of the Blaisdell case, the states can take steps to protect 
its citizens and its communities. 
 In Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes recognized that the 
dire economic conditions created by the Depression justified 
the Courts decision.  The Minnesota law was one of many 
passed during the period in the wake of mass violence and an 
avalanche of foreclosures and forced sales.77 Lenders were able 
to take advantage of farmers at foreclosure sales, paying paltry 
sums for what ordinarily would have been valuable property.78 
 As one author has put it, “…if there was ever a time 
and place for debtor relief, Minnesota was the place.”79  The 
legislature passed the law for good reasons and a non-
discriminatory purpose.  In the 1780s the debtor protection law 
passed by the states that so concerned the farmers 
discriminated in favor of their own citizens against out of state 
creditors.80 
 The Minnesota law only dealt with in-state mortgage its 
purpose was not to harm creditor interests but to protect the 
state’s economy.  It was sound public policy.  The law may 
have impaired mortgagor’s rights but did not abrogate them. 
 One is left to wonder why more states did not attempt 
to take similar action during the Great Recession of 2008-2013.  
Was it the timidity of the politicians or the power of the 
banking interests that caused so many foreclosures and 
dislocations? 
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